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of international 'free zones'. 4 While the real estate bubble has now burst and there has been an overextension of leisure and tourism megaprojects, Dubai and its neighbouring emirates have historically confounded their critics, and are likely to rebound when the international conditions improve. However, long term investor confidence in these strategies remains in question given the UAE's awkward geographic location close to regional hot spots, and given the rising level of other security concerns, both external and internal. Should such threats escalate, and ever directly or indirectly involve the UAE, then the federation's carefully cultivated reputation for political and economic stability would likely decline, thereby severely impacting upon its fragile foreign investment-dependent development trajectory.
As the first section of this article will demonstrate, the UAE's wealthiest Moreover, as an unfortunate but perhaps inescapable hidden cost of its emergence as the region's premier free port, for many years Dubai has attracted the attention of both international criminal and terrorist organisations, many of which have exploited the emirate's laissez-faire attitudes and impressive physical infrastructure 5 to set up various smuggling, gunrunning, human trafficking, and money laundering operations. 6 Most significantly, despite Dubai's undoubted usefulness to such groups, the final section of this article will reveal that the UAE has been unable to remain completely in the eye of the storm and has suffered from a number of terrorist attacks on its own soil.
Military Power
The first formal security force tasked with protecting the sheikhdoms of the lower Gulf was set up in the late 1950s. By the late 1960s, the British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts (previously known as Levies) were being funded almost exclusively by Abu Dhabi, as its oil revenues began to accumulate. 7 Britain had anticipated that all regional divisions of the scouts would be amalgamated into one newly independent -albeit federated -emirates preferred to set up their own security organisations. By the end of the year the Dubai Defence Force had 500 men and had purchased a number of patrol boats, fighter aircraft, and tanks. 8 Although by the late 1970s the DDF had approximately doubled in size, its commanders accepted that it was impractical to create a full scale army and thus they preferred to concentrate on buying high quality equipment so that Dubai would have a lightly armed task force capable of rapid deployment in the event of emergency. 9 As such, by the time that the DDF was finally absorbed by Abu Dhabi's much larger Union Defence Force in the mid-1990s, it had become a small but well-trained force with a tightly organised structure (including a specific women's unit 10 ) and superior hardware.
Problematically, however, given that Dubai had been procuring equipment independently of Abu Dhabi for over 25 years, this meant that the newly reinforced and genuinely federal UAE Armed Forces was made up of largely incompatible hardware and munitions. Perhaps as a symbol of autonomy, for much of the 1980s 83 and soon after a Land Rover was blown up in Buraimi itself. 84 As panic spread, all motorists began to place sandbags on the fenders of their cars so as to better absorb such explosions. 85 Qawain. 87 Although the exact method of the attack remains unknown, the British agent surmised that timers had been set so that the bombs would explode upon the Dara's arrival in Muscat and that bad weather had caused them to go off early.
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Indeed, it later transpired that after planting their explosives the terrorists had left the ship when it berthed in Bahrain before eventually being captured in Oman. 
Conclusion
The UAE is now more vulnerable than ever before to uncontrollable external circumstances. This is especially true given that the economic diversification 
